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Impact of Institutional and Political Variables On  
Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries 
 
Jade Phung 
 
I. Introduction  
Literature on foreign direct investment (FDI) has been focusing on its traditional 
determinants for a long time and lack of attention to institutional and political variables. However, 
in recent years, the pattern of the world FDI flows is observed to show a shift away from developed 
countries towards developing countries. Such shift is argued to be the result of the improvement 
in institutional qualities and political stability in developing countries to make investment climate 
more appealing to foreign investors. The impact of institutional qualities on FDI flows, however, 
have not been investigated by many studies in the field of FDI. To address this shortcoming, this 
research studies the relationship between institutional and political variables on FDI inflows in 
developing countries.  
The process of globalization has accelerated rapidly over the last three decades. During the 
period 1993 – 2015, the volume of world merchandise trade has increased by 103.3%, from $3.7 
trillion in 1993 to $16 trillion in 2015. Surprisingly, the large increase in world trade volume does 
not make trade the fastest growing channel of globalization. The flows of foreign direct 
investment2, which refers to the type of investment made by multinational corporations to foreign 
countries, soared by 107% from $220 billion in 1993 to $1.7 trillion in 2015, at a much faster 
growth rate than volume of trade. Prior to 1990, the increase of inflows was mainly due to large 
increase of investment to developed countries. However, after the 1990s, the growth of FDI 
inflows into developing countries have gradually accelerated and contributed 55.5% to the world 
foreign investment flows in 2014, surpassing the amount of investment into developed countries 
to become the largest group countries of destination to world FDI inflows. The remarkable growth 
rate of FDI flows into developing countries plays an important role in making FDI the fastest 
growing channel of globalization and intrigues many scholars’ interest in explaining why 
developing countries can attract such a large amount of foreign investment.  Empirical 
research has supported the argument that large consumer base and trade liberalization in 
developing countries are factors that attract foreign investment. Per Chakrabarti (2000), prior to 
2000, most eminent empirical studies on FDI find that market size has significant impact on FDI 
inflows into developing countries. Theoretically, market size is important in attracting foreign 
direct investment because the largest component of world FDI stock, FDI in services, is gravitated 
towards large consumer base developing countries. After 2000, using more advanced econometric 
approaches, Al-Sadig (2009), Noorbakhsh, Paloni, & Youssef (2001), Bénassy‐Quéré, Coupet, & 
Mayer (2007), and Busse, & Hefeker (2007) also support the argument that market size is a 
determinant of FDI. The rest of the world’s FDI inflows is FDI in manufacturing and primary 
products. For instance, numerous foreign corporation located in North African countries take  
 
                                               
2 Formal definition of FDI obtained from the World Bank is “the net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting 
management interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of 
the investor.” 
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advantage of the region’s natural resources by exporting primary products back to their home 
countries. Smartphones of Korean corporations, produced and assembled in South East Asian 
countries, are exported to the targeted customer countries. Consequently, FDI in manufacturing 
and primary products has gravitated towards developing countries with more liberalized trade 
regimes. Even though prior to 2000, the empirical studies did not consistently find trade to be a 
significant determinant of FDI, various recent research3 have provided empirical evidence that 
countries with lower trade barriers attract more FDI (Chakrabarti., 2000).  
Market size and trade, though predominantly found to be significant determinants of FDI 
in developing countries, may not be the only determinants. Since 1990, despite having larger 
consumer bases and more liberalized trade policy, developed countries have gradually receiving 
less increase in FDI than developing countries have. Indeed, from 2013 to 2014, FDI flows to 
developing countries decreases by approximately 28%4. Thus, with the improvement of 
institutional qualities in developing countries, some studies5 suggest the rising importance of 
political and institutional variables to attract FDI into developing countries. The UNCTAD 2015 
World Investment Report emphasizes that the improvement in institutional qualities and political 
stability in African countries draw an increase in FDI inflows to this region. Furthermore, since 
institutional qualities and political stability are important elements of investment climate, 
enhancement in institutional qualities and more stable political conditions such as enforcement of 
property rights and control for corruption encourages foreign investors. Because those variables 
have been introduced recently, there has not been much empirical research studying extensively 
those determinants.  
This research, therefore, is going to study the importance of institutional and political 
variables in attracting FDI inflows to developing countries. I hypothesize that better institutional 
qualities and less political risk and instability increase the FDI inflows into developing countries. 
The study will apply pooled OLS and Arellano-Bond GMM estimation methods on two panel data 
sets consisting of 40 developing countries during 4 different time periods to test the hypotheses. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The second section introduces the theoretical 
background and reviews related empirical studies. Then, the next section presents the data sets, the 
choice of measurements, and descriptive statistics, followed by methodology section which 
discusses estimation methods. The result section analyses the results of estimation, while the last 
section concludes. 
 
II. Theoretical Background and Literature Review 
In macroeconomic studies, FDI is usually studied from the aspect of a source of capital to 
boost the growth of a country. However, the study of FDI determinants are often based on 
microeconomic theories. According to Dunning (1988), the characteristic of each foreign direct 
investment varies by numerous factors, including the type of industry, source country, and the size 
of the corporation. Thus, it is not possible to specify the determinants of FDI because different 
factors have different level of importance to foreign direct investment depending on the type of 
investment. However, the data for FDI by industries are not often available and difficult to gather, 
especially data for investment in developing countries. The prominent theoretical framework 
                                               
3 Noorbakhsh, Paloni, & Youssef (2001), Al-Sadig (2009), and Busse & Hefeker (2007). 
4 UNCTAD World Investment Report (2015) 
5 Glass and Saggi (2002), Bénassy‐Quéré, Coupet, & Mayer (2007) 
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proposed by Dunning (2002) introduces an approach to examine the determinants of FDI from a 
macroeconomic perspective, which helps to overcome the unavailability of data.  
The OLI paradigm, developed by Dunning (2002), consists of three key arguments, based 
on the assumption of profit maximization by multinational corporations. Foreign firms, which own 
competitive advantages such as innovative technology relatively to firms in the recipient countries, 
have incentive to invest abroad (O - ownership advantage). If the transaction cost of outsourcing 
to produce or distribute goods in foreign countries is higher than the cost of acquiring the business 
and self-operating production process, firms have an incentive to internalize the intermediate 
process to lower the cost (I – internalization advantage). Lastly, the investors are attracted to 
countries that can provide them with locational advantages such as immobile production factors 
(e.g. labor) and tax exemption (L – locational advantage). As political and institutional variables 
are the locational advantages of developing countries to attract investors, the arguments for those 
variables fit entirely in the L-location sub-paradigm. Furthermore, considering that in recent years 
a large amount of FDI flows into developing countries, it is possible that the improvement of 
political stability and institutional qualities in those countries play significant roles in attracting 
investment.  
Indeed, several established empirical studies have focused on testing whether political 
variables are determinants of FDI. Those studies acknowledge that, theoretically and empirically, 
political variables have significant impact on driving the flows of FDI. Busse and Hefeker (2007), 
applying GMM methodology to a data set of 83 countries, test the hypothesis that political 
instability has negative impact on FDI inflows to developing countries. The study finds that out of 
12 variables, 10 of those are significant with the expected signs, concluding that developing 
countries with higher political risk attract less FDI inflows. Habib and Zurawicki (2002) and Al-
Sadig (2009), which hypothesize that corruption has negative impact on FDI inflows to developing 
countries, also find corruption to have significant and negative coefficients. Both studies utilize 
two types of data set, a cross sectional and a panel, to confirm the hypothesis. The estimations of 
empirical model for both data sets show that corruption has a negatively significant coefficient, 
which confirms the robustness of their findings. Furthermore, Wei (2000), applying a modified 
TOBIT model to a data set prior to 2000, finds that regardless of the type of source country, 
corruption in recipient countries leads to a decline in FDI. Interestingly, the study by Jiménez 
(2011) on the impact of corruption on FDI from Southern European countries to their neighboring 
developing countries finds that corruption is significant but positive. The author argues that 
corrupted governments are preferred by some investors because more corrupted government is 
easier to bribe so the foreign firms can obtain looser regulations and more advantages.  
Institutional variables, on the other hand, have not been extensively studied. Intellectual 
property rights (IPR), an important component of institutional, are often considered a factor which 
attracts FDI, especially in R&D and technological products, by creating a barrier to enter the 
market for domestic firms in recipient countries. Contrary to this argument, Glass and Saggi 
(2002), modeling the situation when IPR regulation is introduced in developing countries, finds 
that IPR, indeed, discourages FDI. Bénassy‐Quéré, Coupet, & Mayer (2007), using a cross 
sectional model on a data set with 75 institutional qualities, concludes that institutional variables 
are important determinant of FDI into developing countries. Through three steps of estimation to 
correct for endogeneity and multicollinearity, some institutional variables are found to be 
significant. Some of those are internal control of banks, intellectual property rights, easiness to 
enter a market, employment contract protection, contract laws, guarantee of bank lending, and 
information on the quality of goods and services. While the coefficient for IPR is significant and 
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positive, unexpectedly labor law enforcement is also found to have negatively significant 
coefficient. This indicates that developing countries with looser protection on labor are preferred 
by foreign investors.  
Some control variables are also included for our empirical model. Based on the survey by 
Chakrabarti (2000), it is necessary to control for the market size of recipient countries. Following 
the survey by Faeth (2009) and recent studies6 on FDI, I also consider infrastructure, trade, and 
labor force as control variables, since those variables, which represent the locational advantages 
of the recipient countries, are found in previous research to be significant determinants of FDI. 
 
III. Data 
Bénassy‐Quéré, Coupet, & Mayer (2007) chooses bilateral FDI stock to be the dependent 
variable. Similarly, Wei (2000) also uses bilateral FDI stock as the dependent variable. However, 
since all independent variables in this research are measured annually in flows, I find FDI inflows 
to be the better choice of measurement as the dependent variable. Furthermore, to neutralize large 
country effect, the measurement of dependent variable is chosen to be FDI inflows as percentage 
of GDP.  
Following Busse & Hefeker (2007), I consider three political variables including 
corruption, political risk, and government effectiveness. Corruption measurement is available in 
the three data sets, the Institutional Profile, World Governance Indicator (WGI), and Corruption 
Perception Index. The methodologies to determine the corruption level are different among those 
data sets, but all the measurements have a high level of correlation. Thus, to gather the largest 
number of observations, I choose the indicator Control of Corruption: Estimate7 of the WGI to be 
the proxy for corruption. The only one indicator available as a proxy for political risk and 
government effectiveness is provided by the WGI. Thus, the proxies for those are the indicators 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism and Government Effectiveness, respectively.  
An aggregate index which evaluates institutional qualities is not available. However, 
following the study by Bénassy‐Quéré, Coupet, & Mayer (2007), this research obtains more than 
70 measurements of institutional qualities from the Institutional Profile data set published by the 
Ministry of French Finance. The advantage of using an individual measurement of each 
institutional quality allows the study to specify which institutional quality has significant impact 
on FDI. However, I also acknowledge that while all institutional qualities may impact FDI inflows, 
it is not necessary one or a few institutional qualities will show significant influence. Thus, the 
significance of institutional qualities may be diminished. Bénassy‐Quéré, Coupet, & Mayer (2007) 
tests all 75 indicators using a cross sectional estimation for only one period due to data 
unavailability. In this study, instead of examining all institutional qualities, I study 11 variables8 
                                               
6 Asiedu (2006); Ranjan & Agrawal (2011); Jiménez (2011); Noorbakhsh, Paloni, & Youssef (2001). 
7 Control of Corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. 
(World Bank) 
8 Those are Transparency of economic policy (fiscal, taxation, monetary, exchange-rate, etc), Government respect for 
contracts, Settlement of economic disputes: justice in commercial matters, Administered prices and market prices, 
Information on the situation of firms, Information on the quality of the goods: international norms and standards, 
Intellectual property, Competition: productive sector: ease of market entry for new firms, Openness to foreign capital 
and loans, Existence and observance of labor legislation and measures, and Employment contract protection 
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found to be significant in Bénassy‐Quéré, Coupet, & Mayer (2007) out of 16 to investigate whether 
those variables are determinants of FDI in longer time span.  
Control variables are obtained from the World Development Indicator of the World Bank. 
Trade is measured by Exports plus imports (% of GDP), suggested by the previous studies9. The 
proxies for market size, infrastructure, macroeconomic stability, and labor force are GDP per 
capita (current US$), Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people), Inflation, consumer prices 
(annual %), and Labor force participation rate, total (% of total population ages 15+), 
respectively. The choice of those proxies follows the studies Asiedu (2006), Ranjan & Agrawal 
(2011), Jiménez (2011), and Noorbakhsh, Paloni, & Youssef (2001). 
 
Table 1: Data Sources and Measurements 
Determinant Variable Measurement Abbreviation 
Data 
sources 
FDI Dependent 
Foreign direct investment, 
net inflows  
(% of GDP) 
FDIGDP 
World 
Bank 
Market Size 
 
GDP per 
capita (current 
$) 
GDP per capita (current 
US$) 
GDP 
World 
Bank 
Macroeconomic 
Factors 
Stability 
Inflation, consumer prices 
(annual %) 
CPI 
World 
Bank 
Trade Openness Trade level 
Exports plus imports (% of 
GDP) 
TRADE 
World 
Bank 
Infrastructure 
Infrastructure 
capability 
Mobile cellular 
subscriptions (per 100 
people) 
MOBILE 
World 
Bank 
Labor Factors Labor force 
Labor force participation 
rate, total  
(% of total population ages 
15+) 
LBFC 
World 
Bank 
Political Risk  Political risk 
Political Stability and 
Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism 
PVEST 
World 
Bank 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Government 
effectiveness 
Government Effectiveness GEE 
World 
Bank 
Corruption Corruption Control for corruption CCEST 
World 
Bank 
 
Since data for institutional variables are only available in three time periods, I consider two 
different data sets. Both data sets use the same measurements for control and political variables. 
However, the first data set has three time periods with time gap and includes institutional and 
political variables, while the second data set only considers political variables with an extended 
time span from 2002 to 2014. The first data set is limited to 40 countries, while the second data set 
                                               
9  
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contains 111 developing countries. Data are obtained from the Institutional Profile data set 
collected by the Ministry of French Finance, the World Governance Indicator (WGI), and World 
Development Indicator (WDI) of the World Bank. Table 1 presents the data sources, the measures 
for each variable, and expected signs. Table 2 and 3 (in the appendix) present the descriptive 
statistics. 
 
IV. Methodology 
The estimated equation for the first data set is as follows: 
 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐺𝐷𝑃 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑛𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑛 + 𝛽𝑚𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑚 + 𝛽𝑚𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑚 + 𝜖 
 
where INST, POL, and CONTROL are vectors of institutional, political, and control variables. 
The second data set does not include institutional variables. Thus, I omit the vector INST to 
estimate coefficients for the second data set.  
In the first data set, since institutional variables are highly correlated to each other, it is not 
possible to include several institutions in the same equation. Hence, I introduce each of the 11 
institutional variables successively in a pooled OLS estimation. Despite neglecting the time and 
cross-country effects, pooled OLS, comparing to fixed/random effects, can include the lagged 
value of the dependent variable as independent variable to control for endogeneity. Furthermore, 
to overcome the limitation of pooled OLS, time and region dummies are also incorporated into the 
estimation equation. The exact estimation equation for this data set is as follow: 
 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐺𝐷𝑃 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑛𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑛 + 𝛽𝑚𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑚 + 𝛽𝑚𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑚 + 𝛽𝑚+1𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑙𝑎𝑔 + 𝛽𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑝
+ 𝛽𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑟 + 𝜖 
 
Since the second data set has a longer time span comparing to the first data set and includes 
111 countries, generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation can be applied to effectively 
account for endogeneity. This method instruments the first lag of the dependent variable with its 
second and third lags. Thus, if the second and third lags of FDIGDP are not correlated with its 
present values, endogeneity can be tackled using this method10. Due to the shorter T and longer N 
of the second data set, the Arellano–Bond GMM estimator is preferred. The estimation equation 
is as follow: 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐺𝐷𝑃 =  𝛽0+𝛽𝑚𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑚 + 𝛽𝑚𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑚 + 𝜖 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
10 Cameron & Trivedi (2009).  
Dependent variable: Foreign direct investment Expected signs 
Infrastructure  + 
Market size + 
Macroeconomic stability - 
Level of trade openness + 
Labor force participation + 
Control for corruption + 
Political risk - 
Government effectiveness + 
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V. Results  
Table 4: Regression Results 
Dependent Variable 
FDIGDP 
First Data Set Second Data Set 
Pooled OLS Arellano–Bond GMM 
GDP 
-.0001676  
(-1.46) 
-.0005097 
(-0.98) 
FDI lag 
.4750539 
(2.11)** 
.3613264 
(1.92)* 
MOB 
.0004125 
(0.04) 
.0181447 
(1.70)* 
TRADE 
.0309989 
(2.04)** 
-.0013564 
(-0.07) 
LBPART 
.0534439 
(1.03) 
-.138242 
(-0.80) 
CPI 
-.0113116 
(-0.30) 
.0654122 
(1.59) 
PVEST 
-.2315694 
(-0.48) 
-.311525 
(-0.29) 
GEE 
-.3446391 
(-0.33) 
3.344584 
(1.99)** 
CCEST 
1.133426 
(1.06) 
-1.319436 
(-1.02) 
Employment  
Contract Protection 
-.7404039 
(-2.26)** 
 
Constant -1.342547 
(-0.39) 
16.67337 
(1.53) 
Observations 151 1169 
Countries 40 111 
Period 2006 – 2012  
3-year time gap 
2002 – 2014 
F – Test (model)/Wald test 6.47*** 76.68*** 
Sargan test  484.8355*** 
R-Squared 0.4856  
Notes: Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation through cluster-robust 
VCE estimators provided by STATA. t/z-values are in parentheses. Data sources and definitions of 
variables are provided in Table 1. Region and time dummies are omitted from the table.  
*Significance at the 10% level 
**Significance at the 5% level 
***Significance at the 1% level. 
 
 All the regression results for the different data sets are presented in Table 4. The first 
column reports the pooled OLS regression results with the institutional variable being Employment 
contract protection for the first data set. Surprisingly, the coefficients for all institutional variables 
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are insignificant, except for employment contract protection that has a significant coefficient with 
the expected sign.  
Per Bénassy‐Quéré, Coupet, & Mayer (2007), employment contract protection impedes 
FDI since a loosely regulated labor market is considered a locational advantage of developing 
countries. Intellectual property is found to have insignificant impact on FDI, consistent with the 
model derived by Glass and Saggi (2002). Even though the result does not follow Bénassy‐Quéré, 
Coupet, & Mayer (2007), since the previous study only considers a one period span, the results of 
this research can overcome its cross-sectional bias. None of the political variables shows 
significance, which indicates possible issue with multicollinearity and the absence of country 
effects caused by the limitation of pooled OLS method. The coefficients for trade and lagged 
FDIGDP are significant with expected signs, which imply that higher trade openness and FDI 
inflows in the past positively increases the present level of FDI in developing countries. 
The second column of Table 4 reports the Arellano–Bond GMM estimation for the second 
data set. The coefficients for infrastructure and lagged FDI are significant with the expected signs. 
However, trade openness is no longer a significant determinant of FDI. Of three political variables, 
government effectiveness is the only variable with a significant coefficient with the expected sign. 
Though control for corruption and political risk are not significant, all political variables are so 
highly correlated that the significance of one variable may diminish the importance of others.  
The regression results of both data sets indicate that market size, macroeconomic stability, 
and labor force are not significant determinants of FDI. It is possible that since the lagged value 
of FDI is included in the regression analysis the effect of those determinants is offset. Furthermore, 
the choice of measurement for market size is not the best choice even though it has the most data 
availability. 
In short, the regression analysis of two data sets indicates that institutional qualities have 
not been important determinants of FDI in developing countries though the results support that 
employment contract protection has negative impact on FDI. On the other hand, consistent with 
previous studies, political variables are found to be significant determinants of FDI. Stable politics 
attracts more investment towards developing countries. The significance of trade openness and 
mobile also reinforces their importance as determinants of FDI. Lastly, the past level of FDI 
strongly impacts the present level of FDI in developing countries, which may explain the 
continuous increase of FDI flows into developing countries and decrease of FDI flows into 
developed countries.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
This study investigates the importance of institutional and political variables in driving 
foreign direct investment into developing countries. Institutional variables are expected to be 
important determinants of FDI in developing countries in recent decades, while political variables 
have been found to be significant driver of FDI in previous studies. Then, by applying pooled OLS 
and Arellano-Bond GMM methods on two data sets, I obtain the estimated coefficients. In contrast 
to the original expectation, the regression results indicate that institutional variables are not 
important determinants of FDI except for Employment contract protection. On the other hand, 
political variables are found to be significant determinants of FDI, reinforcing the previous studies. 
Trade openness, infrastructure, and past FDI level also impacts the flows of FDI to developing 
countries strongly.  
Phung 
 
 
 
96                                        The Park Place Economist, Volume XXV 
 
Based on the results of this study, institutional qualities, though their importance to FDI is 
growing in recent years, are still not primary drivers of FDI into developing countries. Future 
research may extend the time span to reinvestigate the importance of institutional variables in FDI 
in developing countries. Employment contract protection is found to be a negatively significant 
determinant of FDI, suggesting possible future study on the impact of labor cost in FDI in 
developing countries. Political variables are found to play important roles in determining FDI. 
Thus, countries with less corrupted and more effective government attract more FDI. Lastly, 
countries with more trade openness and better infrastructure are more appealing to investors.  
 
Appendix 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics (First Data Set) 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
FDIGDP 1437 4.869248   6.736008 -8.400837 89.47596 
GDP 1440 3035.985 3133.17 106.017 23347.66 
MOB 1433 55.68188 43.32695 0 189.3831 
TRADE 1422 84.6888 38.96308 19.11879 321.6317 
LBPART 1443 64.82155     11.255 37.8 89.6 
CPI 1428 7.955685 17.70829 -35.83668 431.6998 
PVEST 1443 -.4536978 .8444521 -3.184814 1.41685 
GEE 1443 -.5141023 .5902153 -2.247729 1.24741 
CCEST 1443 -.548647 .5585557 -1.836495   1.274802 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics (Second Data Set) 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
FDIGDP 153 3.824812 4.067667 -3.751147 26.49648 
GDP 154 3740.413 3362.227 194.078 15154.47 
MOB 156 71.38221 40.91105   1.107029 185.8216 
TRADE 152 71.664 31.99841 22.10598 202.5777 
LBPART 156 64.0359   11.6425 40.5 88.7 
CPI 156 6.63617 5.499749 -2.248021 36.7023 
PVEST 156 -.601439 .7874352   -2.691796 1.08013 
GEE 156 -.3522287 .5019549 -1.492773 1.196392 
CCEST 156 -.5215726 .4533292 -1.42297 .9195152 
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